A consumer who wants to consume a good at a particular period may nevertheless attempt to buy it earlier if he is concerned that the good will otherwise be sold. We analyze the behavior of consumers in equilibrium and the price a profit-maximizing firm would charge. We show that a firm profits by not selling early. If, however, the firm is obligated to also offer the good early, then the firm may maximize profits by setting a price which induces consumers to all arrive early, or all arrive late, depending on the good's value to the customer.
Introduction
It would appear that if a firm has no cost of staying open to accept orders, it will open as early as possible. But we shall see that is not necessarily true. Suppose that all consumers prefer consuming the good in period 1. But if the store opens in period 0, and only one unit of the good is available, some consumers, fearing that the good may be unavailable in period 1, may go to the store in period 0, and buy the good early. By opening the store only in period 1, the firm precludes such wasteful behavior. The paper shows that the monopolist himself does not gain by offering the good early.
Of special interest to us is rent seeking behavior-will consumers buy the good earlier than at the time they most value consuming the good because they fear a stockout. Such rent seeking behavior is common. People have been known to wait in line for hours to buy a new model of iPhone, before others do. 1 They have also camped out for days and nights in the hope of buying a house 2 Perhaps firms create such artificial shortages, or set prices that generate excess demand, to publicize the good, or to create a buzz about it. We do not examine such motives, but our model does examine how the costs consumers incur in seeking the good affect demand for the good and the price the firm can charge.
A contribution of this paper is to shed light on inventory problems. If the firm is known to offer the good only in one period it never holds any inventory. So examining inventory issues requires asking why the firm offers the good in multiple periods. Related issues are examined by Antoniou and Fiocco (2019) who investigate the inventory behavior of a firm faced with forwardlooking consumers who can store a good in anticipation of higher future prices. They show that a seller who cannot commit to future prices can profit from holding inventory when buyers may stockpile. Other work, well surveyed by Antoniou and Fiocco (2019) , documents buyer stockpiling in anticipation of higher future prices. But in that work, unlike in ours, a consumer who buys early does not affect the welfare of a consumer who intends to buy later.
A further contribution of the model is to examine a seller's decision of when to offer the good for sale, and thus to allow examination of how governmental regulations (such as blue laws, or hour restrictions on stores) affect prices or sales. 1 See https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/20/apple-iphone-11-goes-on-sale-with-lines-outside-major-stores-around-the-wor html 2 See "House buyers sleep on street for NINE nights to buy homes." https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ people-camping-out-cars-first-16230962
Literature
A large literature considers dynamic pricing, in which a seller changes the price over period for the purpose of price discrimination-high-valuers buy the good early at a high price, whereas low valuers buy the good later at a low price. Under some conditions profit-maximization may require prices to decline over period, as in Su (2007) , where consumers differ both in willingness to pay and in willingness to wait. Other work also considers a firm which has a fixed inventory to sell over an infinite horizon rather than over two periods (Gallien 2006) . A firm may also profit by creating shortages in future periods-the possible shortage induces consumers who highly value the good to buy it at a high price, expecting a possible shortage in future periods. Analyses have considered such strategies when consumers observe the stock of inventory at the period they may buy, and when they do not. Papers considering observable stocks, and sales over two periods, include Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , and Zhang and Cooper (2008) . A similar model, but with customers not observing the seller's stock, is Gallego, Phillips, and Sahin (2008) . Advance sales, that is a sale made before the item is delivered, with the possibility of resale, is studied by Cachon and Feldman (2018) . Their model focuses on the different prices the firm may charge in different periods, and on a consumer who learns over time his valuation of the good. Like us, they allow for the possibility that a consumer who does not buy in an early period may find that the good has been sold to someone else at an earlier period. But, in contrast to our analysis, they do not consider consumers who differ in the period at which they most value the good, and do not consider how one consumer may change his behavior depending on what other consumers do.
Little work considers a firm's strategy when it wants customers to hold inventory instead of having the firm incur the expense of holding inventory. An important, and early, paper is Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman (1981) . They describe an inventory model in which both consumers and the retailer minimize their own costs, with the variations in price inducing customers to buy early. Glazer and Hassin (1986) consider shifting consumer demand when their holding costs are higher or lower than the firm's. Anily and Hassin (2013) 
Assumptions
The monopolist can sell one unit of the good, either in period 0 or in period 1. All consumers most value the good in period 1; nevertheless a consumer can buy the good in period 0 and consume it then. Alternatively, we can think of a consumer buying the good in period 0, holding it until period 1, consuming then, but incurring holding costs. Such early buying reduces the consumer's utility from V to V − K. This cost K can arise because early buying causes the consumer to incur a holding cost. Or, as with ice cream, the store can keep item cold but the consumer cannot, so that a consumer must consume the good at the period he buys it.
If several consumers arrive simultaneously, the good is allocated randomly to one of them. The good's price is P . That price is fixed over the two periods, perhaps because of menu costs, perhaps because consumers would get angry if they are charged more than they had remembered from an advertisement issued by the store, perhaps because in posting a higher price for one period than for another, some consumers would recall only the higher price, and so be unwilling to go to the store. Going to the store costs a consumer a search cost c, whether he gets the good or not.
Let the equilibrium probability that a consumer chooses to arrives in period t, be q t , t = 0, 1.
Let U t be the corresponding expected utility. A consumer who does not come to the store at all (or who never arrives) obtains zero utility.
In each period, a consumer may decide to arrive with certainty, to never arrive, or to arrive with positive probability less than 1. And if each consumer arrives with positive probability in any period, the aggregate probability that a consumer arrives may be 1 or less than that. Some of these possibilities, however, are irrational (for example that a consumer arrives with certainty in period 0 and also arrives with certainty in period 1). That leaves seven possible outcomes. We list them as follows, where q t is the probability a consumer arrives in period t.
Equilibrium behavior
For the probabilities q t to constitute an equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. A consumer who chooses never to arrive would have non-positive expected utility were he to arrive at either period. That is, q 0 = q 1 = 0 =⇒ U 0 , U 1 ≤ 0.
2. If a consumer chooses never to arrive in period 0, but chooses to arrive in period 1 with probability less than 1, then arriving in period 1 must generate 0 utility, whereas arriving in period 0 generates non-positive utility. That is, 0 < q 1 < 1 and q 0 = 0 =⇒ U 1 = 0 and U 0 ≤ 0.
3. If, however, a consumer chooses to arrive in period 0, or in period 1, or not to arrive at all, all with positive probabilities, then his expected utility arriving at any period must be zero.
That is, 0 < q 1 , q 0 < 1 and q 0 + q 1 < 1 =⇒ U 0 = U 1 = 0.
4. If a consumer chooses to arrive in period 0 with probability less than 1, but never arrives in period 1, then his expected utility when arriving in period 0 must be zero, whereas his expected utility when arriving in period 1 must be non positive. That is, 0 < q 0 < 1 and q 1 = 0 =⇒ U 0 = 0 and U 1 ≤ 0.
5.
A consumer who arrives with positive probability at either period 0 or period 1 must be indifferent between arriving at these periods. And if he always wants to arrive at some period, his expected utility must be non-negative. That is, 0 < q 1 , q 0 < 1 and q 0 + q 1 = 1 =⇒
6.
A consumer who chooses to arrive in period 0 must expect higher utility than arriving in period 1 or of never arriving. That is, q 0 = 1 =⇒ U 0 ≥ max{U 1 , 0}.
7. Lastly, a consumer who chooses to arrive in period 1 must enjoy utility at least as large as when arriving in period 0 or of never arriving. That is,
Let the number of potential consumers, or the number of consumers under consideration, have a Poisson distribution with intensity λ. This assumption fits the situation with a large population of potential consumers, each person wanting the good with a small probability; the Poisson distribution is then obtained as the limit of the Binomial distribution.
Although all consumers more highly value the good in period 1, if a fraction q 0 > 0 nevertheless arrives in period 0, then the number of consumers arriving in period 0 has a Poisson distribution with intensity λ 0 ≡ λq 0 . The number of consumers arriving in period 1 has a Poisson distribution with intensity λ 1 ≡ λq 1 . The expected utilities are
Note that the expression for U 1 is multiplied by the probability e −λ 0 that no consumer arrives in period 0, and hence the good is still available in period 1.
By L'Hôpital's rule, lim λ→0
1−e −λ λ = 1. So as λ increases from 0 to 1 the function decreases
The firm's expected profit is Π = P (1 − e −λ 0 −λ 1 ).
Characterizing the different equilibria
Lemma 1. There is at most one equilibrium of each type.
Proof. The claim is straightforward for equilibrium types 7, 6, and 1, where q 0 and q 1 are explicitly defined.
The type-3 equilibrium (where a consumer may choose never to arrive) requires that U 0 = 0, which uniquely defines λ 0 . Substituting the resulting value in U 1 = 0 uniquely defines the candidate λ 1 . For the type-2 equilibrium, which assumes λ 0 = q 0 = 0, λ 1 follows as above. Similarly, the type-4 equilibrium already assumes that q 1 = 0, leading to λ 1 = 0, with λ 0 uniquely determined by U 0 = 0.
The type-5 equilibrium (where a consumer is indifferent between arriving in periods 0 and 1)
requires that q 0 + q 1 = 1, or equivalently that λ 0 + λ 1 = λ. Substituting this condition into the 1] it is uniquely defined (and corresponds to an equilibrium).
We now analyse the existence of equilibrium types according to the input parameters. We normalize V − P = 1 and λ = 1. To simplify the notation, call the expected number of people arriving in period 0 x ≡ λ 0 ; call the expected number of people arriving to the store in period 1 y ≡ λ 1 . For each type of equilibrium we present the conditions on c and K for having an equilibrium of that type. Note that we describe the feasibility region for equilibria of types 3-5 using parametric representation of the conditions on c and K.
1.
A type-1 equilibrium (where no consumer ever arrives) has λ 0 = λ 1 = 0, U 0 ≤ 0, and U 1 ≤ 0, requiring that 1 − K ≤ c and that c ≥ 1.
2.
A type-2 equilibrium (where no consumer arrives in period 0, but may arrive in period 1) has λ 0 = 0. The condition U 1 = 0 is equivalent to c = 1−e −y y , implying that c ∈ (1 − 1/e, 1). The condition U 0 ≤ 0 means that K + c ≥ 1. 4. For the type-4 equilibrium (where no consumer arrives in period 1, but consumers may arrive in period 0), for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the condition U 0 = 0 implies that K = 1 − c x 1−e −x , and U 1 ≤ 0 with q 1 = 0 implies that c ≥ e −x . 5. In the type-5 equilibrium (where a consumer is indifferent about when to arrive), λ 0 + λ 1 = 1.
And the non-negativity of U 1 reduces to c ≤ e −x 1−e −(1−x)
1−x . This condition also implies that
6. In a type-6 equilibrium (where consumers may arrive in period 0), λ 0 = 1 and λ 1 = 0.
7. In a type-7 equilibrium (where consumers may arrive in period 1), λ 0 = 0 and λ 1 = 1. The From Figure 1 we conclude that for most combinations of c and K a unique equilibrium exists.
However, in the narrow region where a type-5 equilibrium exists, other equilibria also exist.
In the following, denote λ e ≡ (λ 0 , λ 1 ).
Example 1 Let a consumer's cost of going to the store be c = 0.2. Let a consumer's penalty for buying the good earlier than at his ideal period be K = 0.4. Then the pair of arrival rates at the store λ 0 = 0 and λ 1 = 1 is a type-7 equilibrium (where consumers may arrive in period 1). The pair λ 0 = 1 and λ 1 = 0 (denoted by λ e = (1, 0)) is a type-6 equilibrium (an equilibrium where consumers may arrive in period 0). And the pair λ 0 = 0.6305 and λ 1 = 0.3995 is a type-5 equilibrium. Note that the type-7 equilibrium is efficient. A consumer who wants to consume the good in period 1 arrives in period 1. A type-6 equilibrium suggests inefficiency. Although consumers want the good in period 1, they arrive in period 0. So if the waiting cost is positive, a consumer who arrives early may incur a cost without increasing the benefit he gets from the good. Early arrival reflects rent-seeking behavior. The same applies for a type-5 equilibrium. In terms of social welfare (the aggregated utilities), note that the social welfare function, denoted as SW , satisfies 
Thus social welfare for the equilibria of types 7, 6 and 5 equilibria are 0.432, 0.179 and 0.056, respectively. Put differently, if the store refused to sell in period 0, consumers would be better off.
Early arrival reflects behavior of strategic complements or follow the crowd (see Hassin and Haviv 2003) , where a consumer's best response tends to follow the strategy of the others. Typically in such situations there are two extreme pure-equilibrium strategies and one mixed strategy.
Example 2 Let c = 0.4 and K = 0.37. Then λ e = (0, 1) is a type-7 equilibrium, λ e = (0.041, 0.959)
is a type 5 equilibrium, and λ e = (0.989, 0) is a type-4 equilibrium.
Example 3 Let c = 0.4 and K = 0.4. Then λ e = (0, 1) is a type-7 equilibrium, λ e = (0.63, 0.37) is a type-5 equilibrium; λ e = (0.8742, 0.085) is a type-3 equilibrium.
We now change the way we normalize the parameters and assume (instead of V − P = 1) that c = 1. To simplify the presentation, we use V to represent V − P .
1. In a type-1 equilibrium λ 0 = λ 1 = 0. The utilities U 0 and U 1 will both be non-positive only
3. For the type-3 equilibrium with 0 ≤ λ 0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ 1 ≤ 1, U 0 = 0 implies that V = K + x 1−e −x (with x ≡ λ 0 and y ≡ λ 1 ). And U 1 = 0 amounts to V = e x y 1−e −y .
For the type-4 equilibrium
, with 0 ≤ λ 0 ≤ 1, U 0 = 0 implies that V = K + x 1−e −x . And U 1 ≤ 0 (with q 1 = 0) amounts to V ≤ e x .
For the type-5 equilibrium with
The non-negativity of
6. In a type-6 equilibrium, λ 0 = 1 and λ 1 = 0. The conditions U 0 ≥ U 1 and U 0 ≥ 0 reduce to V ≥ e−1 e−2 K, and V ≥ K + e e−1 .
7. In a type-7 equilibrium, λ 0 = 0 and λ 1 = 1. The conditions U 1 ≥ U 0 and U 1 ≥ 0 reduce to K ≥ V e and V ≥ e e−1 . 
Unbounded potential demand
The model with finite potential demand is too difficult to solve analytically. Moreover, we also showed that the equilibrium is not always unique. Therefore we consider the simpler situation with an infinite potential demand λ. Then the only possible equilibrium types are 1-4. The conditions for types 1 and 2 are as before. Assume first that the price P is zero. The line separating Regions 3 and 4 satisfies U 0 = U 1 = 0 and λ 1 = 0. Thus from (1) we have
Recalling that lim λ→0
1−e −λ λ = 1, and utilizing (2), with U 1 = 0, gives V e −λ 0 = c. That is,
We find it convenient to normalize all monetary values by considering c as the unit value. Thus
In particular, from the equation above we get
We can verify that for v > 1, the right-hand side of (4) strictly increases from 0 to infinity.
Thus, for every k > 0, Equation (4) has a unique solution u(k). Hence we define The partition of the (v, k) plane is shown in Figure 3 .
Recall that v = V c . Thus, for example, the condition v ≤ 1, that defines Region 1, corresponds to V ≤ c, etc.
Summarizing, in Region 1, (where 0 < v ≤ 1), because the search cost exceeds the value of consuming the good, consumers never arrive. In Region 2, (where 1 < v ≤ k + 1), the value of an early purchase is smaller than the search cost, so consumers arrive only in period 1. In Region 3,
, and u(k) was defined in Definition 2), the arrival rate in period 0 is such that the expected utility of a consumer arriving then is zero. But the added benefit, k, of buying in period 1 rather than in period 0 is sufficiently large to compensate for the reduced probability of getting the good in period 1. Thus, consumers arrive in both periods. In Region 4, (where v ≥ u(k)), the small value of k means that a large arrival rate in period 0 discourages consumers from arriving in period 1.
By setting a price p = P c , the net benefit of the purchase reduces to v − p. Thus, an increase in p means moving to the left in the (v, k) space. The equilibrium, and therefore the profit, depend on the region where we end up.
Summarizing the results on the four regions:
where u was defined in Definition 2.
Two equations are central for the model. First, the equation U 0 = 0, which is satisfied in Regions 3,4, and by (3) gives
Second, the equation U 1 = 0 which is satisfied in Regions 2,3, and by (2) gives
Arrival rates
We consider the behavior of λ 0 , λ 1 and λ 0 + λ 1 in each of the regions.
Proposition 3.
Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period, and p the price of the good. The arrival rates (namely λ 0 and λ 1 ) in period 0 and 1 satisfy:
• In Region 1, λ 0 = λ 1 = 0.
• In Region 2, λ 0 = 0, and λ 1 increases with v − p.
• In Region 3, λ 0 , λ 1 > 0, λ 0 increases with v − p, and λ 1 declines with v − p.
• In Region 4, λ 0 increases with v − p, and λ 1 = 0.
As expected, the arrivals rates λ 0 and λ 1 usually decline with the price. Nevertheless, an exception appears in Region 3, where λ 1 declines with v − p. An explanation is that a higher price induces fewer consumers to arrive in period 0. This makes it more likely that the good is still
available in period 1, and so more consumers arrive in period 1, even though the price is higher.
The proof of Proposition 3 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.1).
Moreover, the following theorem claims that in Region 3 (where consumers may arrive in both periods and expected consumer utility is zero) the arrival rate in period 1 increases with the price, and this increased arrival rate exceeds the reduced arrival rate in period 0.
Theorem 4. Let a consumer value consuming the good more in period 1 than in period 0 (that is, k > 0). Let the value of consuming the good at the ideal period be v, and the price of the good Figure 4 ).
is the inverse function of ae a , that satisfies W [a] ≥ −1.
The following properties of W will be used below. For proofs see Corless et al. (1996) .
is an increasing function for all a ≥ −e −1 .
• W6. W [ae a ] = a for all a ≥ −1.
To prove Theorem 4, we first need to establish several results. 
The proof of Proposition 7 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.2.1).
The proof of the following Corollary is very similar to the proof of Proposition 7.
Corollary 8.
Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period 1, p be the price of the good, k be the reduced utility if a person with ideal period 1 buys the good in period 0, and
, the unique arrival rate that solves (6) is Denote
Proposition 10.
Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period 1, p be the price of the good, and k be the reduced utility if a person with ideal period 1 buys the good in period 0. Then in Region 3 (where consumers may arrive in both periods and expected consumer utility is zero) the unique solution to the equation system of (5) and (6) is
The proof of Proposition 10, appears in the Appendix (see 
Profit maximization
Consider the profit-maximizing price.
The seller's expected profit (in units of c) is the price p > 0, multiplied by the probability that the good is sold (which is the same as the probability of at least one arrival), thus π = p 1 − e −(λ 0 +λ 1 ) .
For any given pair (v, k), we need to find the price that maximizes the seller's profit. As explained, raising the price is equivalent to moving to the left of v. The first step, is to find the expression for π in each region and then the local maximum of each of these expressions. However, these local maxima may be obtained outside the region in which the corresponding expression of π is valid, and in that case it is irrelevant. In other words, the prices that are relevant are the local maximum points that satisfy that (v − p, k) still belongs to the original region of (v, k). In case of a region that has no relevant local maximum, we need to check its end points. Among these candidates of p, the p * that attains the maximal value for π(p), is the price that maximizes the seller's profit.
For any given pair (v, k) we now express the four regions in terms of p. At the beginning of Section 5, we defined the regions in terms of v − p. The definition of the regions in terms of p, are: Figure 5 , that presents π for v = 10 and k = 2. The numbered regions in Figure 5 correspond to the regions in Figure 3 .
In this example, Regions 2 and 4 each has a relevant local maximum. But in Region 3, the expression for π is monotonically increasing in p, and thus the right end of Region 3 is also a candidate. As seen, in this example the local maximum in Region 2 is the price that maximizes the seller's profit. The monotonicity of π seen in Region 3 in this example also holds in general for all (v, k), as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period, and k the reduced utility of consuming the good at an earlier period. For given values of p and k, the firm's profit π increases in p for all p, s.t., (v − p, k) belongs to Region 3 (where consumers may arrive in both periods and expected consumer utility is zero).
Proof. By (7), π = p 1 − e −(λ 0 +λ 1 ) . Now, by Theorem 4, in Region 3, λ 0 + λ 1 declines in v − p, hence λ 0 + λ 1 increases in p. This implies that π = p 1 − e −(λ 0 +λ 1 ) also increases in p.
It follows from Proposition 11 that in general, the global maximum can never be attained inside Region 3. However, it may be attained at its right end v − k − 1.
As we will show, in general, Regions 2 and 4 do not always have relevant local maxima.
Denote 
Denote π(p i ) = π i , i = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 13. Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period 1, p the price of the good, and k the reduced utility if a person with ideal period 1 buys the good in period 0.
1.
2.
3.
The proof of Proposition 13 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.3.1).
Theorem 14. For all p ≥ 0:
where π i = π(p i ), p i is the local maximum of the expression of π in Region i = 1, 2, and π 3 = π(p 3 ),
where p 3 = v − k − 1 is the border point between Regions 2 and 3.
The proof of Theorem 14 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.3.2). The following Corollary follows from Theorem 14.
Corollary 15. If p 2 is in Region 2, then the price that maximizes π is p 2 .
We now find the conditions that guarantee that p 2 is in Region 2.
Lemma 16. If 1 ≤ v ≤ e W +k+1 , then p 2 belongs to Region 2.
The proof of Lemma 16 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.3.3).
For larger v, namely v ≥ e W +k+1 , we need to find where π 3 ≥ π 4 is satisfied. In that case, p * = p 3 . Recall that p 3 is the point that separates between Regions 2 and 3, therefore it always exists and is relevant. But p 4 , which is the local maximum of the expression for π in Region 4, may not belong to Region 4, and in that case it is not relevant.
Recall that
Denote v m as the minimum of f in Region 3.
Lemma 19. Given k, f (v) is a strictly convex function which has exactly two roots, the smaller of which is k + 1.
The proof of Lemma 19 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.3.4).
Definition 20. v f is the unique value that satisfies both: f (v) = 0, and v > k + 1.
See Figure 6 that presents f as a function of v, for k = 1.
Since f (v) = π 4 − π 3 , it follows that for all v satisfying k + 1 < v < v f , π 4 < π 3 . Recall that by Theorem 14, π 3 ≤ π 2 , and that by Lemma 16, p 2 is relevant for all v satisfying 1 ≤ v ≤ e W +k+1 . • For all 1 ≤ v ≤ e W +k+1 , p * = p 2 , and π * = π 2 .
• For all e W +k+1 < v ≤ v f , p * = p 3 , and π * = π 3 .
But what happens for v > v f ? By Lemma 19, π 4 > π 3 for v > v f . But, is p 4 relevant (i.e., belongs to Region 4), for v > v f ? The following Lemma says Yes.
Lemma 23.
1. If v ≥ k + u, then p 4 belongs to Region 4.
For every pair
The proof of Lemma 23 appears in the Appendix (see Section 8.3.6).
Recall that W stands for W [−(k + 1)e −(k+1) ], and that v f is the root of f (v) that is greater than the root k + 1. The following theorem summarizes the results.
Theorem 24. Let v be the value of consuming the good at the ideal period, and k the reduced utility of consuming the good at an earlier period. Then for given values of v and k, the profit-maximizing (normalized) price (p * ), the induced arrival rates (λ 0 and λ 1 ), and the associated expected (normalized) profit (π * ) are 1. If v < 1, then λ 0 = 0, λ 1 = 0, and π * = 0.
If
The profit-maximizing strategy may have the firm set the price such that consumers buy only in period 1 (cases 2 and 3) or only in period 0 (case 4). The firm's profit depends on the value of k (the penalty for hiring early). The firm's profits are not maximized when k = 0, but rather when k makes the value of e W +k+1 greater than v. Profits are then π 2 = v − 1 − ln v, which, according to Theorem 14, is the maximum profit. Note that this conclusion relates to the case in which the firm must offer the good at both periods. But as the following section shows, the firm is always better off not offering the good early.
Outcomes with a single period
Consider a model with a single-period, in which consumers are only allowed to come in period 1.
This is equivalent to making k infinite in the original model with two periods. Then, unless v < 1 (which results in π = 0), lim k→∞ e W +k+1 = ∞. And so 1 ≤ v < e W +k+1 , thus belonging to the second case in Theorem 24. Hence π * = π 2 = v − 1 − ln v. By Theorem 14, π 2 ≥ π 3 , π 4 . Hence the seller's highest profit is when selling the good in period 1. It does not offer the good at an earlier period than the period most desired by the consumers.
Social optimization
Clearly, social welfare is optimized when consumers only buy in Period 1. The optimal arrival rate λ 1 is determined by solving max λ 1 {v 1 (1 − e −λ 1 ) − λ 1 }, which gives the optimal value λ * 1 = ln v − p. We now ask whether when the arrival rates are determined by consumers' equilibrium behavior, is it socially optimal to forbid early sales.
Denote the normalized (i.e., divided by the search cost c) social welfare functions in the singleand two-period cases as SW 1 and SW 2 respectively. If v < 1, then there are no arrivals, hence SW 1 = SW 2 = 0. Assume v ≥ 1. For the single-period case, because all consumers need to pay the (normalized) search cost of 1 but at most one consumer gains the good (if indeed there is at least one arrival), then
As k → ∞, Regions 3 and 4 become empty, so we are left with Region 2. In Region 2, equation (6) gives v − p = λ 1 1−e −λ 1 . Substituting this in (11) gives 0. For the two-period case, one may assume that larger k reduces social welfare. However, we show now that in equilibrium, social welfare is 0 for all k The reason is that in all 1-4 types of equilibrium, whenever there is a positive arrival rate, λ i > 0 then the corresponding utility satisfies
Proposition 25. In all equilibria, social welfare in the two-period case equals zero, namely, SW 2 = 0.
Proof.
• In Region 1, λ 0 = λ 1 = 0. Substituting this in (12) gives SW 2 = 0.
• In Region 2, (6) with λ 0 = 0, gives v − p = λ 1 1−e −λ 1 . Substituting this in (12) gives SW 2 = 0.
• In Region 3, by (5) and (6) we have v − p − k = λ 0 1 − e −λ 0 , and v − p = λ 1 e λ 0 1 − e −λ 1 .
Substituting this in (12) again gives SW 2 = 0.
• In Region 4, (5) with λ 1 = 0, gives v − p − k = λ 0 1−e −λ 0 . Substituting this in (12) gives SW 2 = 0.
Back to the finite case
When the arrival rate λ is finite, equilibrium types 5-7 do exist. The sum of arrival rates λ 0 +λ 1 = λ is fixed. This implies that the expected profit π = p 1 − e −(λ 0 +λ 1 ) = p 1 − e −λ is linear and increasing in p. Hence the candidates for the maximum points are the border-points between the regions. For the other (former) equilibria types 1-4, we proved that for equilibrium type 3, λ 0 + λ 1 increases with p, so the points on the left borders of the region in Figure 2 are candidates for maximal profit. In equilibrium types 2 and 4, we have proved that there is a local maximum for π that are also candidates for maximal profit. These results still hold for the finite case.
Conclusion
A consumer who wants to consume a good at a particular period may nevertheless attempt to buy it earlier if he is concerned that in delaying he would find the good already sold. This paper considers a model in which the good may be offered at two periods; the period in which all consumers most value the good (period 1), and an earlier period (period 0). We show that a firm profits by not selling early. The strategy of consumers, when deciding if and when to arrive, is more complicated than one may suppose, and can generate some unexpected behavior. For example, the arrival rate at period 1 may decline with the surplus a person gets from buying the good; indeed even the aggregate arrival rate (from both periods) can decline with that surplus. The behavior of the firm can also be surprising. If the firm is obligated to also offer the good early, but must charge the same price in both periods, then, depending on the value of the good to a consumer, the firm may maximize profits by setting a price which induces consumers to arrive only in period 1, or under different conditions, induces them to arrive only in period 0. The firm would not set a price which induces consumers to arrive in both periods. This result also means that, even with an infinitesimal cost of opening the store in some period, the firm will not want to remain open in all periods. In any case, under the assumptions of the model, the firm is always better off not offering the good early.
Appendix
Let
Then v 1 is the consumer's benefit when buying in period 1 at price p, and v 0 is the consumer's benefit when buying in period 0 at price p. Note that given v and k, the values v 0 and v 1 are functions of p. We find that most of the expressions appearing in our analysis, are functions of v − p − k, thus we center our attention on v 0 .
Summarizing the results on the four regions in terms of v 0 ,
• In Region 1, λ 0 = λ 1 = 0, U 0 , U 1 ≤ 0, and it is reached iff −k ≤ v 0 < 1 − k.
• In Region 2, λ 0 = 0, 0 < λ 1 < λ, U 1 = 0, U 0 ≤ 0, and it is reached iff 1 − k ≤ v 0 ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that x ≡ λ 0 , y ≡ λ 1 .
1. The proof of the first statement of the proposition follows immediately from the definition of Region 1.
2. In Region 2, λ 0 = 0. Thus (6) becomes
Hence
Because y +1 ≤ e y , for y ≥ 0 The numerator on the right-hand side satisfies 1−e −y (1+y) ≥ 0.
Thus v 1 ≥ 0 and v 1 increases with y. Hence y increases with v 1 (and thus in v 0 ), proving the second claim of the proposition. From (5) and (6) together, we have
The left-hand side of (13) declines with x ≡ λ 0 since
The expression e x (x − 1) + 1, appearing in the numerator on the right-hand side, increases with x and equals 0 when x = 0. Hence it is positive and so −ke −x − e x (x−1)+1 (e x −1) 2 < 0, implying that the left-hand side of (13) indeed decreases in x. In contrast, the right-hand side of (13) increases in y ≡ λ 1 . Thus y decreases in x. Because x ≡ λ 0 increases in v 0 , it follows that y ≡ λ 1 declines with v 0 , proving the third claim of the proposition. 4 . In Region 4 y ≡ λ 1 = 0 and (5) is satisfied. And so, as in Region 3, x ≡ λ 0 increases with v 0 , proving the last statement of the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 4
To prove Theorem 4, we first need to establish several results, using the Lambert function W [x], (see Definition 5 in Section 5.1). We have also presented a list of W1-W6 properties of the Lambert function, that we use in our analysis ahead (see Section 5.1).
Recall that we have denoted
R(a) = W [−ae −a ].
Proof of Proposition 7
First, we show that λ 0 = v 0 + R(v 0 ) indeed solves (5) .
By W5,
Substituting this in (14) gives
which is the left-hand side of (5). Now, because the right-hand side of (5) is monotonic in λ 0 , then for any given v 0 the value
uniquely solves (5).
Proof of Proposition 10
Recall that A(a) = −(a + k)e −a+ kR(a) a , and that A = A(v 0 ). From Proposition 7, λ 0 = v 0 + R(v 0 ) uniquely solves (5) . Substituting this in (6) gives
Since the right-hand side of (16) is monotonic in λ 1 , for any given pair v 0 , v 1 at most one value of λ 1 satisfies (16). We now show that the proposed solution
Substituting this λ 1 in the right-hand side of (16) gives
.
Because of W5, this expression is equal to
Since v 1 = v 0 + k, the above equals
Hence we need to prove that the quotient above equals 1, namely that
Note that the expression e
appearing on the left side satisfies
Substituting this in the left-hand side of (17) gives
Hence we only need to prove that
This is equivalent to proving that
Note that the left-hand side of the above equation equals
By (15) the above equals
Several lemmas for the proof of Theorem 4
Recall Definition 2, that u = u(k) satisfies k = u − ln u
, is strictly increasing in u, which is strictly increasing in k.
The following lemma proves essential properties of the function R(v 0 ).
Lemma 26.
• R1. R(v 0 ) is negative and increasing for all v 0 > 1.
1. Since −v 0 < −1 < 0, then −v 0 e −v 0 < 0, and by W1 and W4, R
2. To prove R2, note that by W2 R(1) = W [−e −1 ] = −1. Applying the Lambert function to both sides of the equation gives
We wish to prove that
The left-hand side of (18) is R(u − k). Now by W6, since k u − 1 ≥ −1 then
proving R3.
4.
R
Hence by W3,
For the next result we need the following lemma. 
By R1 and R2, in Region 3: 1 + R(v 0 ) > 0, and −R(v 0 ) > 0. Hence the derivative is positive and
, and recall that u = u(k).
Lemma 28.
1. Since W is strictly monotonic and by W2, W [−e −1 ] = −1, we must prove that A(u − k) = −e −1 . Now,
From R3, R(u − k) = k u − 1. Substituting this in the right-hand side of (20) gives
2. To prove that A(v 0 ) is decreasing, we arrive at
where R = R(v 0 ). By R1 and R2, the denominator is positive. Thus we need to prove that the numerator is negative. The expression in the first parentheses is positive since . We wish to look at W [A] as a function of k. Given v 0 , denote by k 0 , the k that satisfies v 0 = u(k 0 ) − k 0 , and denote u 0 = u(k 0 ). Also denote by A 0 the A that correspond to k 0 , namely
Lemma 29. Given v 0 :
is increasing in k, in Region 3.
d dk W [A]
is decreasing in k, in Region 3.
k=k 0
To prove that
By Lemma 27, v 0 + (v 0 + k)R < 0 in Region 3, thus dA dk > 0 and A is increasing in k in Region 3. Since W is an increasing function, then W [A] is also increasing in k in Region 3.
Using W3, we arrive at
The above
Differentiating the above expression with respect to k gives
The first term in (23) is negative. The second term is also negative since we proved in Part 
Note that for k = k 0 , the numerator vanishes according to Lemma 27, and the denominator vanishes according to Part 1 of Lemma 28.
By L'Hôpital's rule
, then (24) becomes
Recalling that v 0 + (v 0 + k 0 )R appearing in the numerator equals 0, and that W [A 0 ] = −1, we obtain
Note that s = 0 does not solve (25), hence the above expression is well defined. From (25)
we get
Substituting this, and also v 0 = u 0 − k 0 , in (26) gives
Now, from the proof of the first part of Lemma 29, (that W [A] is increasing in k, in Region 3), we get that d dk W [A] is non-negative in Region 3. In particular, s ≥ 0. Combining this with the fact that s = 0, which we established earlier, gives s > 0. This, together with (27), implies that s = 1 u 0 .
We can now prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that u = u(k) is the solution for k = u − ln u 1− 1 u (see Definition (2)).
In Region 3, by Proposition 10,
We utilize R4 and (21), to arrive at
where the derivative is according to v 0 . According to R1 and R2, R + 1 > 0 in Region 3 and according to Lemma 28, W [A] + 1 > 0 in Region 3. Hence, the denominator is positive in Region 3. Thus it is sufficient to prove that the numerator is negative.
By substituting the end points of Region 3, namely, v 0 = 1, v 0 = u − k, it is easily verified that at the end points of Region 3, the numerator vanishes. We wish to prove that for all k ≥ 0, the numerator is negative for all 1 < v 0 < u − k (i.e., for all v 0 in Region 3).This is illustrated in Figure 7 which presents the numerator as a function of v, for k = 2. Note that u(2) = 3.81449, hence Region 3 is 1 < v 0 < 1.81449. Recall that we denoted v 0 = u 0 − k 0 . For any given v 0 , if we look at the numerator as a function of k, then, as explained, for k 0 = u 0 − v 0 (corresponding to the right end point v 0 = u 0 − k 0 of Region 3 when k = k 0 ), the numerator equals 0. We wish to prove that given v 0 , for all k > k 0 , the numerator is decreasing as a function of k, and therefore is negative. This will be proved shortly and is demonstrated in Figure 8 .
In Figure 8 which presents the numerator for k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, we see that at v 0 = 1.81449 the numerator equals zero for k = k 0 = 2, (upper line), and then for increasing k, the value of the numerator decreases (and is thus negative as claimed). Note also that the length of Region 3, increases with k. This is so, since for all k > 0, the left end of Region 3, is 1, and the right end is
, which increases with u and thus with k. In particular when k → 0, the right end u(k) − k → 1, and so when k = 0, Region 3 is empty (since it consists of 1 < v 0 < 1).
Given v 0 , denote by N (k), the numerator of (λ 0 + λ 1 ) (when the derivative is with respect to v 0 ), namely
We now differentiate N (k) with respect to k. Note that v 0 and k 0 are fixed in k, and consequently R, which is a function of v 0 only, is fixed as well.
We will first prove that d dk N (k) for k = k 0 is negative. We will then prove that d dk N (k) is 
Since for all k > 0, we have u − k > 1, then the first factor in (30) is negative, and the second factor is positive in Region 3, proving that indeed d dk N (k) k=k 0 < 0 in Region 3. We now prove that d dk N (k) is decreasing in k, for all k > k 0 . By (29)
This equals v 2 0 (R + 1) 
is a linear function of k with a negative multiplier 2R(R + v) for k, hence it is also decreasing in k. So indeed, d dk N (k) is decreasing in k, for all k > k 0 . Since we have proven that d dk N (k) k=k 0 < 0, then it follows that for all k > k 0 , d dk N (k) < 0. Now, since N (k 0 ) = 0, then it follows that N (k) < 0, for all k > k 0 . This means that the numerator of
Hence, for all k > 0, and for all 1 < v 0 < u − k, (i.e., Region 3) (λ 0 + λ 1 ) < 0, implying that λ 0 + λ 1 decreases in v 0 in Region 3. 
Because d dλ 1 π = 0 for λ * 1 = ln v, the local maximum profit of Region 2, and the profit associated with it, are defined in (8).
2. Recall that in Region 4, λ 1 = 0. By (5) we have
So by (7) 
giving the profit-maximizing value λ * 0 = ln (v − k). Hence, the local maximum profit of Region 4, and the profit associated with it, are given by (9) .
3. Because p 3 = v − k − 1 separates between Regions 2 and 3, at this point λ 0 = 0, and so
Hence by Proposition 10, in Region 3,
Thus by R2, we obtain for v 0 = 1
Substituting λ 1 = W + k + 1 in π 3 gives (10).
Proof of Theorem 14
1. By (9) , π 4 = v − k − 1 − ln (v − k) , and by (8), π 2 = v − 1 − ln (v). Note that for y ≥ 1, the value of y − 1 − ln y is increasing. That result and the inequalities 1 ≤ v − k < v imply that π 4 < π 2 .
2. To prove that π 3 ≤ π 2 , we must prove that
which is equivalent to proving that
We will find the maximum value of the left-hand side of (34) and show that it equals −1. To find the maximum we solve
The solution is v = e W +k+1 , for which the second derivative is − 1 v 2 . Hence e W +k+1 is a local maximum. e W +k+1 = e W e k+1 = −(k + 1)e −k−1 e k+1 W = k + 1 −W .
We now show that for v = e W +k+1 , the left-hand side of (34) is −1. By W5 we obtain 
Proof of Lemma 16
We will first prove that p 2 belongs to Region 2, iff ln v 1− 1 v ≤ k+1. Then, we will prove that ln v 
Hence in this case, p 2 ≥ v − k − 1, and so p 2 is in Region 2. Now, we will show that the unique solution for
is e (W +k+1 Hence e W +k+1 solves (37). Because the left-hand side of (37) is strictly increasing, e W +k+1 uniquely solves (37).
Proof of Lemma 19
First, note that f (k + 1) = 0. Now,
and we have f (v) = 1 (v − k) 2 > 0, hence f is indeed strictly concave, thus has at most two roots. To see that k +1 is not the only root, we need to find v m the minimum of f in Region 3, and show that k + 1 = v m . To solve f (v) = 0, we utilize (38), and get
This is equivalent to v − k = − k + 1 W .
and so v m = k − k+1 W , is the minimum of f in Region 3. We now show that k + 1 < v m . Since −(k + 1)e −(k+1) ≥ −e −1 for all k > 0, and W (·) is an increasing function, then W = W [−(k + 1)e −(k+1) ] ≥ W [−e −1 ] = −1. Thus for all k > 0, W > −(k + 1), and so
Hence f has exactly two roots.
Since f is strictly convex and f (v m ) < 0, (since f (k + 1) = 0, and v m is the minimum of f ),
then v m lies between the two roots. Since we have established that k + 1 < v m , then
Proof of Corollary 21
Recall that by (35) we have e W +k+1 = − (k + 1) W .
Thus
where the last inequality follows from (39).
Proof of Lemma 23
1. Recall that Region 4 refers to all p satisfying 0 ≤ p ≤ v − u.
To prove that p 4 ≥ 0, we must prove that
This is equivalent to
Hence we need to prove that
Note that v − k ≥ u ≥ 1, (where the last inequality follows from the fact that u = u(k) ≥ 1, for all k ≥ 0). For v − k ≥ 1, (40) always holds since the left-hand side of (40) equals 1, for v − k = 1 and is increasing for v − k ≥ 1. Hence p 4 is indeed non-negative. We now prove
The left-hand side of the above equals p 4 , so we have
Recall that u = k + ln u Hence we need to prove that u ≤ − (k + 1) W . 
